The researchers initially came up with the insurance pool idea as a solution to the growing need for organs for children, as youngsters would have been unable to participate on their own behalf in the formerly proposed future market system.
The pair propose the pool be organized as a government-run monopoly to simplify the collection and transferring of organs to pool recipients, and to ensure a level of trust that would encourage potential donors to join.
They also expect the idea would be more attractive to "risk-averse" individuals, such as those with higher incomes, who would tend not to be enticed by monetary incentives.
To avert the problem of too many "high-risk" individuals insuring, sending "premiums" escalating, the researchers recommend required medical examinations for applicants, and only admitting those with a "normal probability" of needing a transplant. Another option would be to create "risk classes" and give low-risk individuals first-priority access to organs donated within their class. "This would encourage low-risk individuals to join, increasing the supply of organs to the benefit of all groups," says Schwindt.
The researchers expect that non-pool members would probably benefit from the scheme, even if the government mandated that non-pool donors organs not specifically targeted elsewhere were first made available to pool members. "That would certainly raise the incentive to join the pool," adds Schwindt, "and the number of organs available."
Given the right factors, Vining and Schwindt believe the mutual insurance pool has the potential to bring supply and demand on par. "What is still uncertain," notes Vining, "is precisely how individuals will respond to this idea -- and how many would chose to join."
CONTACT:
Aidan Vining, 604-291-5249
Richard Schwindt, 604-291-4166
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Contact: Marianne Meadahl
Marianne_Meadahl@sfu.ca
604-291-4323
Simon Fraser University
30-Jul-1998